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Since market scoring rules have become popular as a form of market 
maker, it seems worth reviewing just what such mechanisms are intended to 
do.  
The main function performed by most market makers is to serve as an 
intermediary between people who prefer to trade at different times.  Traders 
who have the same favorite times to trade can show up together to an ordinary 
continuous double auction, and then make and accept offers to trade.  But 
when traders have different favorite times, a market maker can help them by 
first making offers that some of them will accept, and then later making 
opposite offers which others will accept.  By adjusting prices in his favor, a 
market maker can even profit from providing this service. 
By making offers, however, a market maker opens himself up to the risk 
of losing to informed traders who know more than he about asset values.  It is 
a complex and difficult task to choose the price and duration of offers in order 
to profit the most from intermediary trades while suffering the least from 
informed trades.  This task requires subtle judgments about the relative 
fraction of informed and intermediary trades at different times, prices, 
quantities, and trading histories.  No simple algorithm could reasonably claim 
to do this task optimally. 
Very active markets have little need for market makers, as anyone can 
trade at anytime.  In markets with large but sporadic trades, a human will 
likely find it profitable to apply their considerable intelligence to the complex 
task of market making. The question is what to do for smaller less-active 
markets, which cannot afford such human attention.  Trading may simply not 
happen there if no intermediary can be found to make such markets. 
A computer program with less than human intelligence that attempts to 
make markets runs the risk of being out-smarted by human traders.  Humans 
might even figure out how to turn that program into a money pump, giving up 
cash each time it is run through some cycle of trades.  Of course a program 
could be set to shut down once it had lost more than some amount, but then it 
would no longer be making markets. 
In this difficult situation it is somewhat comforting to know that we can at 
least describe a simple program that is guaranteed to always intermediate 
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trades by offering substantial buy and a sell offers close to each other in price, 
and that can do so forever while bounding the amount of money that it could 
ever lose.  While such a program will rarely do an optimal job of trade 
intermediation, it will at least support some trading.  
This simple automated market maker is inventory-based.  That is, it 
always sets its current buy price to be some monotonic function of its asset 
holdings, and always offset from its sell price so as to prevent becoming a 
money pump.  I was not the first to realize this result (Savage 1971; Black 
1971).  If I made an original contribution it was to describe combinatorial 
versions of such market makers (Hanson 2003; 2007).  Given some set of base 
events, a combinatorial market maker can support trades between any 
combination of event-contingent assets defined in terms of events expressible 
as any combination of these base events.  
This sort of market maker, one that can both guarantee perpetual trade 
intermediation and yet bound its losses, is the sort that a neutral exchange 
could reasonably support directly.  More ambitious market maker programs 
must take more risks, and so need to be monitored more closely to ensure that 
they are sustainable and do not covertly favor some traders over others.  
Fortunately multiple market-makers can coexist within a continuous double 
auction market; one can support both a safe inventory-based version and also 
more ambitious but risky versions. 
In addition to firms like Microsoft that have constructed their own simple 
inventory-based market makers, several firms, such as Consensus Point, 
Xpree, and Inkling, now sell software that support such markets.  Software 
engineer Ken Kittlitz of Conensus Point writes about their experience:  
 
"Having run markets both with and without Hanson's automated-
market maker, we say with confidence that it makes a huge difference 
to the success of a market.  Because it maintains buy and sell orders at 
a wide range of prices, it provides a steady source of liquidity that 
would otherwise be lacking.  This allows traders to interact with the 
system in an easy, intuitive manner rather than having to worry about 
placing booked orders at certain prices and waiting for other traders to 
match those orders. The number of trades in a market using the 
market-maker is at least an order of magnitude higher than in one not 
using it." 
 
A few firms, such as YooNew, have even implemented combinatorial 
versions of inventory-based market makers, and Consensus Point will soon 
sell combinatorial software. 
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There are two obvious ways that an inventory based market maker can fail 
to optimally intermediate trades: it can trade too much or too little, via 
offering too much or too little liquidity.  If it offers to trade too much, it may 
end up trading mostly with only one side of the market (e.g., buyers), as the 
price might not move enough to engage trades on the other side.  If it offers to 
trade too little, then those who want to trade more will have to wait, either for 
others to accept direct trader-to-trader offers, or for the market maker to return 
to their price range.  Of these two errors, trading too little is the cheaper risk. 
One can modify a simple inventory based market maker to use different 
price-inventory relations in different circumstances, and in this way adapt its 
liquidity to apparent demand.  But this approach risks unbounded losses to 
clever traders who anticipate and exploit such changes.  For example, if a 
clever trader can anticipate that low liquidity will be followed by high 
liquidity, he might suffer small losses while moving the price far away, but 
then be rewarded with large gains for returning the price back to its starting 
point. 
While trade intermediation is usually the main function market makers are 
created to perform, it is worth mentioning that market makers can perform 
other functions.  In particular, market makers can encourage trading activity.  
Losses of a market maker are gains to its traders, and the prospect of such 
gains should entice more trading.  The details of the added trader incentives 
match details of the market maker’s loss tendencies.  
A nice feature of inventory-based market makers is that they only directly 
reward traders for acquiring more information about asset value.  No other 
trading activity is rewarded directly, though other activity can be rewarded 
indirectly via the combination of the market maker and other traders.  For 
example, traders are rewarded for acquiring information before other traders, 
traders can have incentives to trade to mislead other traders about their 
information, and traders may want to wait for trades with complementary 
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